

Public Service Commission of Wisconsin
Rebuttal Testimony of Mary Kettle
Gas and Energy Division

Wisconsin Energy Corporation
Docket 9400-YO-100

February 19, 2015

1 Q. Please state your name.

2 A. My name is Mary Kettle.

3 Q. Are you the same Mary Kettle that filed direct testimony in this proceeding?

4 A. Yes, I am.

5 Q. Is there anything you wish to correct from your direct testimony?

6 A. Yes, I need to correct one number. On page 8, line 17 of my direct testimony, I state that
7 the revenue requirement impact in 2016 of directing WEPCO to write off its “old”
8 transmission escrow balance would be about \$11 million on a total company basis. That
9 amount is incorrect and should be about \$7.5 million on a total company basis calculated
10 on the net-of-tax balance.

11 Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?

12 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimony of Wisconsin
13 Energy Corporation (WEC) witnesses Allen Leverett, Scott Lauber, and John Reed. I
14 will respond to Mr. Lauber’s testimony regarding the calculation of “regulatory
15 earnings.” I will also respond to Messrs. Leverett and Reed regarding my proposal to
16 include a condition that WEPCO be directed to write off its “old” transmission escrow
17 balance.

18 Q. Please discuss why it is important to measure earnings under the regulatory basis, as
19 defined in your direct testimony, rather than on the fuel rules basis.

1 A. Mr. Lauber's rebuttal testimony points out that the calculation of "regulatory earnings,"
2 as defined in my direct testimony, is inconsistent with the fuel rules calculation of net
3 income and that it should, therefore, be rejected. However, if the Commission includes
4 any conditions in this proceeding requiring refunds or not allowing recovery of deferred
5 costs if the utility overearns, then the measurement of net income becomes important and
6 needs to exclude disallowed costs. If incentive compensation is not excluded from the
7 calculation of net income then, to the extent the utility overearns, the utility would
8 essentially be allowed to recover the cost of its incentive compensation expense from
9 ratepayers. Excluding incentive compensation from the calculation of net income also
10 allows the utility to adjust its actual net income up or down by adjusting the level of
11 incentive compensation it pays up or down.

12 Q. Please comment on Messrs. Leverett and Reed's rebuttal testimony concerning your
13 suggestion that the Commission include a condition that directs WEPCO to write off its
14 "old" transmission escrow balance.

15 A. Messrs. Leverett and Reed are both opposed to my suggestion that the Commission
16 include a condition that directs WEPCO to write off its "old" transmission escrow. Mr.
17 Leverett states that the Commission agreed to the deferral of these prudently incurred
18 costs and that the suggestion to include writing off the "old" transmission escrow as a
19 condition for approval of the acquisition raises legal and policy issues.

20 Mr. Reed implies that I am suggesting the write-off because of WEPCO's long
21 history of overearning. He states that such a concept amounts to "retroactive ratemaking,"
22 which is prohibited in Wisconsin. It should be noted that deferrals themselves are
23 retroactive in nature. In addition, my testimony does not say that I am suggesting the

1 write-off because of past overearnings. I am suggesting the write-off because the company
2 has offered no immediate rate relief to its customers as a result of the acquisition. In
3 addition, the company has no financial incentive to amortize this \$114 million off its
4 balance sheet. The \$114 million balance has remained unchanged since December 31,
5 2012, and is forecasted to remain unchanged until at least December 31, 2016. I discussed
6 WEPCO's past overearning because it is significant, it is persistent in that it happens nearly
7 every year, and it is reasonable to discuss WEPCO's financial performance during the
8 years WEPCO was building up this large balance of deferred costs.

9 Q. If the Commission does not direct WEPCO to write off its "old" transmission escrow
10 balance, is there an alternative condition that the Commission could consider?

11 A. Yes, I believe there is an alternative that would address the lack of financial incentive that
12 WEPCO has to address its large balance of deferred costs and may provide WEPCO's
13 ratepayers with some tangible benefit as a result of the acquisition. Instead of directing
14 WEPCO to write off its "old" transmission escrow balance, the Commission could
15 authorize WEPCO on a going-forward basis to earn no carrying costs on all of its
16 deferred costs or on just the "old" transmission escrow or on any combination of deferred
17 costs.

18 As stated above, WEPCO's "old" transmission escrow will earn \$7.5 million in
19 carrying costs annually in 2015 and 2016. Providing no carrying costs on this balance on
20 a going-forward basis would provide rate relief of \$7.5 million per year on a total
21 company basis, assuming WEPCO continued to not amortize any of the balance. If the
22 Commission wanted to provide additional incentive for WEPCO to address its huge
23 deferral balance, it could provide no carrying costs on all of WEPCO's deferred costs.

1 That option would save ratepayers \$14.8 million in 2016 on a total company basis, based
2 on WEPCO's estimated average 2016 balance of deferred costs of \$462 million and the
3 assumption of a 40 percent tax rate.

4 If the Commission provided no carrying costs on all or part of WEPCO's deferred
5 costs, the company would likely request to shorten the amortization period for its existing
6 deferred costs, which would increase amortization expense such that revenue requirement
7 could increase in the short term. Amortizing its deferred costs over a shorter period could
8 still provide benefit to ratepayers, however, in that the company may be more inclined to
9 try to control its costs to avoid a large rate increase. With WEPCO's electric rates
10 already being relatively high, speeding up the amortization of its deferred costs could
11 cause WEPCO to cut costs in other areas rather than allowing its rates to become even
12 higher than they are now relative to other utilities in the state. In addition, if WEPCO
13 receives no carrying costs on its deferred costs, it may be less inclined to request deferral
14 of additional costs in the future.

15 Q. Do you have any additional comments?

16 A. Yes, I do. My lack of response to any testimony should not be construed to mean that I
17 agree with any particular position by any witness.

18 Q. Does that conclude your rebuttal testimony?

19 A. Yes, it does.

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